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be used in conjunction with a text, paperbacks, assigned chapters 
and articles, or some combination thereof. My mind runs fondly 
back to the collection (now out of print) edited by James Morton 
Smith and Paul Murphy, perhaps because it helped introduce me to 
the field nearly three decades ago. 
MICHAEL ZUCKERTII 
A preliminary comment. In most fields there is a range of 
opinion among competent practitioners as to what constitutes the 
current agenda for the field. In that, I feel safe in predicting, this 
symposium will prove constitutional studies to be no exception. Yet 
constitutional studies differs from many other disciplines, e.g., bio-
chemistry, in that in the latter all competent observers share a fairly 
common picture of where the field currently is, and of what the 
major unsettled issues are. There may be disagreements over priori-
ties among the important questions, or over the proper leads to fol-
low in examining them, or at worst, a fairly well-structured set of 
alternative conceptions of the current state and agenda for the field 
resting on what have come to be called "competing paradigms." 
But constitutional studies is not so well-structured as that, with the 
result that any attempt to speak of a current agenda is rather per-
sonal. That at least is true of my comments. 
Today constitutional scholars face two tasks: to repoliticize 
the Constitution and to depoliticize constitutional law. The Bicen-
tennial season has encouraged many of us to pay close attention to 
constitutional history, and especially to the doings of the founders. 
One of my most abiding conclusions is how different our approach 
to the Constitution is from that of the founders. We are far more 
legalistic than they-witness the fact that most scholarly discus-
sions of the Constitution occur in law journals. But the founders, 
though many were trained as lawyers, and a few even practiced law, 
approached the Constitution not in a legalistic but in a political 
manner. I do not mean, by the way, to endorse the view of, e.g., 
John Roche, that the founders were merely local pols cutting deals, 
but rather to insist that they saw the Constitution preeminently as a 
part of political science, as a way of structuring political life. The 
kinds of argument and reasoning one finds in the Constitutional 
Convention or The Federalist have, for the most part, much more in 
common with the kinds of questions political scientists ask than 
those lawyers ask. The question about representation, for example, 
is not the abstract one about rights, but rather the political one of 
II. Professor of Political Science, Carleton College. 
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the consequences for the operation of legislative bodies of different 
systems of representation. The founders always took their bearings 
from the principle, "We must always remember it is a political soci-
ety we are shaping" as more primary than, or as the real meaning 
of, John Marshall's more famous maxim in McCulloch v. Maryland. 
This is not to say that constitutional scholars ought to start 
reading the American Political Science Review more often; it is re-
markable how small a part constitutional studies play in contempo-
rary political science. This contrasts markedly, not only with the 
age of the founding, but with the situation at the time of the Centen-
nial of the Constitution one hundred years ago, when the leading 
constitutional scholars were the same people as the leading political 
scientists. One might think of John W. Burgess. Political science, 
for the most part, has also moved away from the perspectives of 
James Madison and company. How that happened is a very long 
story, having to do with the great watershed of the Progressive Era, 
which reshaped both political science and the dominant scholarly 
view of the Constitution. 
Both political science and constitutional scholarship suffer 
from this depoliticization of the Constitution. The Constitution is 
too often seen in a merely legalistic manner, or simply as the occa-
sion for an exercise in one or another new scheme of moral theory-
abstract, moralistic pronouncements with little thought for the 
broad political meaning of a constitution. And political scientists 
too often lose the benefits of the institutional or structural insights 
that the founders' constitutionally based political science pro-
vides-although it is heartening to note that within political science 
there has appeared a movement called "the new institutionalism," 
which takes the political science of The Federalist very seriously. 
Paradoxically, the depoliticization of the Constitution has con-
tributed to the politicization of constitutional law. A properly polit-
ical understanding of the Constitution would stand as a guard 
against the now open and almost unabashed effort to use the Court 
as a vehicle for furthering political interests and moral preferences 
which cannot be or cannot so easily be furthered in the normal 
political ways. As I write, the debate over the nomination of Judge 
Bork to the Supreme Court has only begun. It is still some weeks 
before the Senate hearing, but the signs are already clear that the 
debate is and will be openly political in a way that appears unprece-
dented, at least in modern times. I think, for example, of the confir-
mation hearing of Louis Brandeis. Political concerns, that is, 
concern for the likely direction of Brandeis's votes on important 
constitutional questions surely animated many of the participants in 
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those hearings-Brandeis had been very outspoken, controversial, 
and partisan in the years before his nomination, but all parties 
showed a reluctance to address these political concerns openly and 
candidly. Instead people spoke of Brandeis's character and temper-
ament first and of the nature of the Constitution and the judicial 
order second. That is, the criteria brought forward in the discus-
sion of Brandeis were noticeably different from the criteria that 
would be brought forward to discuss a candidate for the Senate or 
presidency. But in Judge Bork's case it seems that this will not be 
so. Judge Bork is opposed, for example, because he is said not to 
favor the interests of blacks or women; or favored because he op-
poses abortion. It has already been noticed that the Bork nomina-
tion has led to the mobilization of interest groups on an 
unprecedented scale. 
To some degree the difference is merely one of openness and 
candor, but that is not the whole of it, and even that difference is 
significant. The openly political terms of the discussion reflect a 
number of developments-some deriving from the Supreme Court's 
well-documented political activism of the past few decades, and 
some deriving from changes in the way scholars have come to con-
ceive of law, of constitutions, of courts, and of interpretation. I take 
as an unargued premise that in the long run the Court will be un-
able to make any positive contribution to American political life if 
the open politicization of constitutional law continues. As others 
before me have wondered, would the American people retain their 
confidence in the Court if they came to understand the Court in the 
way that legal scholars do? The Bork debates may begin to supply 
an answer to that question. 
Depoliticizing constitutional law surely cannot be the accom-
plishment of constitutional scholarship alone-the Court itself has 
very much to do with it. But constitutional scholarship has its part 
to play. The part-in-chief, I am inclined to think now, is to work 
toward transcending the current terms of discussion of the Court's 
role: interpretivism vs. non-interpretivism. Neither pole of this bi-
polarity is a sensible way to discuss what courts do and should do. 
Many efforts are afoot to move beyond these alternatives, the most 
important of which probably is the considerable corpus of Ronald 
Dworkin. But Dworkin's is not altogether satisfactory-in his own 
hands at least, his position becomes manifestly political. Other re-
cent works that come to mind which contribute in a positive way 
are Gary Jacobsohn's The Decline of Constitutional Aspiration and 
Christopher Wolfe's The Rise of Modern Judicial Review. It seems 
to me that within constitutional studies, narrowly defined, this is 
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the kind of work that must go forward. It can and must go forward 
in a number of different ways-through historical studies, especially 
of the founding and the fourteenth amendment, through studies of 
the contemporary Court, and through more philosophic investiga-
tion into the nature of interpretation of the sort Dworkin has so 
interestingly undertaken. 
KERMIT HALLI2 
The Bicentennial has come and gone, and like other such great 
national anniversaries it has produced a legacy of both popular 
schlock and scholarly substance. Recently, we have seen published 
several new books on events at the Philadelphia Convention, a won-
derful (if windy) work by Michael Kammen on the cultural history 
of the Constitution, Forrest McDonald's breathless (and sometimes 
historically controverted) examination of the intellectual roots of 
the document, Philip Kurland and Ralph Lerner's poorly organized 
The Founders' Constitution, and a badly needed edition of Herbert 
Storing's The Complete Anti-Federalist. There have also been nu-
merous special issues of history, political science, and law journals 
devoted to some aspect of the constitutional order. Project '87, 
under the relentless leadership of James McGregor Burns and Rich-
ard B. Morris, succeeded in typical academic fashion in plodding in 
dull ways over mostly arid scholarly ground, although it did man-
age, through This Constitution, to persuade academics to produce 
clearly written articles shorn of the usual mumbo-jumbo trappings 
that accompany so much scholarly writing about the document. 
The times being such as they were, the political Right had the 
good fortune of being able to make its arguments about original 
intent during a year when public and scholarly attention was al-
ready given over to what the framers intended. The Straussians 
have enlivened recent constitutional debate, although their preten-
sions to revealed historical truth have a hollow ring. Moreover, we 
should be glad, as scholars, for Attorney General Edwin Meese, 
since he provided such a convenient target for attacking much of 
the simple-mindedness that surrounded the Bicentennial. The anti-
Meese literature has grown apace, and with it has come a new ap-
preciation for the indeterminacy and ideological cast of so much of 
the scholarship on the Constitution. Given the nature of our polity, 
it is probably a healthy sign that scholars of all political persuasions 
believe that they are right about the Constitution's meaning, even if 
12. Professor of Law, University of Florida. 
